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1

Moderator: Lucy Reed
Speakers: E.Y. Park, Joongi Kim, Beomsu Kim & Kevin Kim
Lucy Reed: Welcome back, everybody. We are now moving to investor
state issues. The heading of this next [panel is] Korean perspectives on trade
and investment multilateral agreements and dispute resolution. I am Lucy
Reed, and my co-panelists are Professor Joongi Kim from Yonsei Law
School and Beomsu Kim, who is head of the international arbitration group
at Shin & Kim. What is interesting is to see that, as with the panel before
with E.Y. Park and Kevin Kim, both Joongi and Beomsu are Korean lawyers
with [a] great deal of experience in the US, practicing law and studying, and
as Kevin was saying before, this is very common for the international
arbitration scene, which is a very vibrant one in Korea. There is a lot of
cross-pollination and a lot of cross education, and many friendships actually,
and co-counsel positions in that whole field. And both of my co-panelists
are active in the Korean Council of International Arbitration, which was
mentioned.

1. 7KLV LV D WUDQVFULSW RI WKH VHFRQG RI IRXU SDQHOV IURP WKH ³'LVSXWH 5HVROXWLRQ LQ WKH
.RUHDQ&RPPXQLW\´6\PSRVLXPFR-KRVWHGE\3HSSHUGLQH¶V6WUDXV,QVWLWXWHIRU'LVSXWH5HVROXWLRQ
and the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, which was held March 6, 2015 at Pepperdine
Law School in Malibu, CA. This panel was moderated by Lucy Reed, a partner at Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, with presentations from Professor Joongi Kim from Yonsei Law School in
Seoul, Korea and Beomsu Kim, a partner at Shin & Kim, along with input from previous panelists,
Kevin Kim, a partner at Bae, Kim & Lee, LLC, and E.Y. Park., a partner at Kim & Chang.
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What we are going to do is this: We realize that not everybody here will
be familiar with the basics of what investment treaty arbitration is, so I am
going to spend ten or fifteen minutes at the most going over some basic
principles and illustrations of investment treaty arbitration. Then we will
hear from Professor Kim on the Korean treaties that exist, and which we
hope are coming, and then from Beomsu Kim on some of the Korean
practice in the area, which again is new and robust. Each will offer you
some real life stories of some high profile cases that are going on right now,
and then to wrap up, I am going to list five questions that I posed on this
topic in 2007²well more than five years ago²and see how the scene has
changed on investment treaty arbitration in Korea. We will wrap up with
that. We welcome questions and interventions from the audience and from
the panel at any time. I of course apologize in advance for those of you who
know everything about this field and it will seem elementary, so you have
permission to daydream if you wish.
Why do we even have investment treaties? The reason is this: Foreign
investments can obviously be subject to lots of risk. I have put a few on the
slide: Civil unrest, exhibit A, Egypt and the number of cases pending
involving Egypt; fiscal changes, Greece; nationalization of assets²the list is
too long recently, but I will mention Venezuela and Bolivia; arbitrary and
discriminatory conduct by the host state²again the list would be extremely
long, so I can just mention Russia right now. So investors, whether U.S. or
Korean or whatever nationality, that have invested in many states in the
world over the past twenty years are facing a great deal of disruption. What
an investment treaty does is limit or manage the exposure for foreign
investors by providing various protections of different types. And all an
investment treaty is, is a treaty between two states, if it is bilateral, or many
states, if its multilateral, in which the host states, welcoming the investment,
promise to give certain protections to the investors from the other state or
states in their territory. For those of you who have not seen an investment
treaty you would be surprised by how short and simple they are; often no
more than five to ten pages and they are following various templates at this
486

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss3/2

2

Reed et al.: Korean Perspectives on Trade and Investment Multilateral Agreemen

[Vol. 15: 485, 2015]

Korean Perspectives on Trade
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

point. Different governments have different model treaties. There are three
basic types²I have mentioned them, bilateral, and multilateral like NAFTA,
which has three states, or the energy charter treaty. And then the newest
area, particularly in Asia, is free trade agreements, which are big trade
agreements in which there will be one chapter on investment and investment
protection. We will be hearing about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is
of course again on the front burner, at least for now.
I have put up, so you can read it yourselves, a typical preamble to a
bilateral investment treaty. This is the treaty between Korea and the
Netherlands, which you can see sounds a lot like the old treaties of
IULHQGVKLS FRPPHUFH DQG QDYLJDWLRQ  6WDWHV VD\ ³:H DUH very good
friends, and we are friends so that we can promote investment, one way or
two ways, and stimulate the flow of capital, raise the standard of living, etc.,
and we will be sure to treat these investments fairly and equitably (which has
become quiWH D FDWFK SKUDVH ´  6R WKDW LV QRW QHZ LQ GLSORPDF\²the
inviting of investment and promising to protect.
What is new with investment treaties is that they allow the private
investor, when there is a dispute over the investment, to bring its own claim
directly against the host government in international arbitration. Before this,
investors were dependent on what we call diplomatic protection or espousal,
which States do not generally like to do. For example, when I was in the
U.S. State Department, and that was in the late eighties, early nineties, I
worked on one of the very last cases in which the U.S. government espoused
the claim of a U.S. investor abroad. We did not win the claim for the
investor and a lot of diplomatic capital was spent. So the States would rather
not be involved with every trade dispute. They leave it now to the private
investors. I really have to underscore what an innovation this is, because in
public international law disputes are between States and, no matter how
many treaties they sign, States do not really like having to answer to private
parties, but that is what is happening in investment treaty arbitrations. And
so they come with a great deal of tension, and we should not pretend
otherwise.
487
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The main arbitration options in these treaties are ICSID, which is the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which is a
World Bank center that administers an arbitration mechanism, which you
will hear more about, and UNCITRAL, which are ad hoc rules for
arbitration of disputes now between States and investors. And the private
institutions for international arbitration are all competing hard to attract
investment treaty arbitrations, to which I am known to say again and again
that be careful about getting what you wish for. I sound negative²but I
have been doing this, unlike most people in the field, since the early 80s, and
they are very complicated cases. They have not taken politics out of
arbitration; they are still very political and complex cases, hence my
warning.
Here is a chart for you from UNCTAD, which shows you that there are
over 3,000 investment treaties signed. The grey line is the cumulative
number. It is now up to over 3,000. You can see the biggest rise was in the
mid-1990s; there were four new treaties a week on average in those years.
Now it has slowed quite a bit. The orange, by the way, are bilateral
investment treaties and the green tips are other ones. Why has it slowed? It
has slowed for two reasons: mainly because there are not that many
permutations of States to enter into treaties anymore and most of them are
done, and also because a lot of States are losing excitement about entering
into more treaties. Back in the early 80s, you can see how few there were,
so this is a very big change.
There are three things you think about when you deal with arbitrating
under these treaties. The first is qualifying criteria. Who is an investor?
And basically the treaties are all the same; an investor has to be a natural
person or a legal person, in the case of the Korea and Netherlands treaty,
either a Korean or Dutch company. Sometimes it is not enough to be, say, a
Korean registered company. You have to show that you have your
headquarters and that you are actually carrying out business in Korea. This
is something the U.S. government insists on in its treaties²the United States
488
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does not protect shelf companies registered in, say, Delaware. You actually
have to be doing business in the U.S. to get protection.
What will be protected? What is an investment? This is usually a very
broad definition. You see here every kind of asset, owned or controlled²
controlled is important²directly or indirectly, by an investor of one state
against the other. Lots of ink has been spilled on what is direct and indirect
control in this area and the treaties can vary quite a bit. What is not
covered? A contract. A simple contract right is not an investment. If you
have a contract with a Korean government purchaser, say for paperclips, and
it is breached you do not have an investment treaty against the government
of Korea.
I call your attention just to the penultimate bullet here: an indirect claim
by a partial shareholder under most treaties is a qualifying claim. One of the
earliest cases we did was for CMS Energy against Argentina, which was the
first of the cases against Argentina after their economic crisis. CMS Energy
owned less than a quarter of the shares in the relevant Argentina pipeline
company, but ultimately was awarded compensation for the unfair and
inequitable treatment of its interest in that pipeline.
What are the substantive protections? We all know there can be no
expropriation of your investment without compensation. Fair and equitable
treatment²you are not supposed to be whipped around by the government,
treating you well one day and less well another day. You are not supposed
to be discriminated against as compared to the locals or other national
investors, and you are entitled to receive full protection and security,
particularly when there is disruption.
Most important are procedural rights under the treaties. We have
already talked about this. You have direct recourse to arbitration with the
KRVW6WDWH7KRVHRI\RXZKRVWXG\DUELWUDWLRQDQGPD\VD\³LW¶VVXSSRVHG
to be consHQVXDOKRZGRHVWKLVZRUN"´7KHWUHDW\LVDVWDQGLQJFRQVHQWIRU
the State to arbitrate with an investor. The investor triggers that consent
with a claim when there is an alleged dispute. There are cooling off periods
to try to get States and investors talking, though this almost never leads to
489
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settlement. A very interesting and growing topic is how we can make
inroads into settlement or mediation of these disputes.
I will go very quickly through the next slides. ICSID is the single
biggest arbitration avenue for investment treaty arbitrations, based on a
Convention that has about 160 countries signed up to resolve their
investment disputes peacefully using this mechanism. It is important that
ICSID is detached from national courts, so the New York Convention does
not matter at all. There is an annulment process for ICSID awards, with
factors similar to those in the New York Convention, but it is all internal to
ICSID. Generally international law does not float unconnected to national
territories, but in ICSID it actually does; it is a free floating system. This
map shows you all the countries that have ratified the ICSID Convention.
They are the blues. The yellow countries are those where there has been a
signature but not a ratification yet. This graph, you can see very quickly,
shows the increase in arbitration cases registered in ICSID, with the big
increase starting in the early 2000s against Argentina, Venezuela, and the
Czech Republic. For a long time, to work at ICSID meant only one or two
cases a year, but now they are very busy.
This pie chart is interesting, in that it shows you the geographical
breakdown of ICSID cases. The big purple piece is Central Asia at 24% and
the pink or light purple is South and East Asia at 8%. So that is a total of
32% of ICSID cases with a geographical connection to Asia. But look at
this pie chart. This is the distribution of appointments of arbitrators in
ICSID cases. The orange piece is for arbitrators from Southeast Asia and
the Pacific at 11%, and to the right the tiny purple one is arbitrators from
Eastern Europe combined with Central Asia at 2%, so only 13% of all
arbitrators come from Asia²despite the 32% of cases with geographic
connection to Asia. This is a very big topic that we all continue to discuss.
This slide is important for those who think there are good reasons why
States do not want to be bound by ICSID anymore, because investors are
getting away with murder. This shows you ICSID cases only, and not other
investment treaty arbitrations. The big purple piece of pie covers awards
490
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upholding the claims of investors against all States. 48% of investors win,
and obviously 52% do not win, so it is not all pro investor. The red piece
indicates cases that die at the jurisdiction phase, for example for lack of a
qualified investor or investment. And the green piece covers the outright
dismissals on the merits against States. So do keep this in mind when you
are talking to taxi drivers in Seoul, who are against the TPP.
Another thing to keep in mind: the number of investment treaties that a
State has entered into does not necessarily have a connection to how many
arbitrations the State may get involved in. So you can see on this chart that
China has over 100 investment treaties, but China has only one ICSID
arbitration. South Korea has 57 BITs²the number has probably changed a
little²and, when I did this chart from ICSID data, there was only one
pending and one concluded ICSID arbitration. A couple more Korean cases
are in the pipeline, we hear. But look at Venezuela²only 24 treaties but
almost 50 cases. So it is not dependent on the number of treaties.
This slide includes statistics for all known investment treaty cases,
ICSID and others, and it shows that States are successful in 60% of the cases
brought against them. This includes UNCITRAL cases that are public (they
are not all public). The total is 176 awards. And the investor claimants do
not get what they ask for. In cases where the claimant wins, the average
damages claimed are about $166 million (USD), but the claimants are
awarded only $76 million. This is a big reduction from what is claimed, for
different reasons²less than 50%. There are some outliers, including a
couple of big awards like the Yukos award against Russia at $50 billion.
To conclude, I have given three or four talks in my career, in Korea or
involving Korea, about investor state arbitration and the TPP, starting in
around 2005, ten years ago. I pulled out some slides I had used in 2007, I
think it was with one of the Korean government programs, and reminded
myself that I ended that talk by listing the questions that were on my mind as
an experienced investment treaty arbitration advocate about what Korea
might face. Here is the list, which we will return to: Will there be cases?
How will the Korean government defend cases? How will Korean investors
491
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prosecute cases? Are they going to use international or local expertise or
both, and what will be seeing? Will it be primarily international and treaty
law or local law or both?
With that I am going to turn it over to Professor Joongi Kim to talk more
about South Korea and its treaties.
Joongi Kim: While we are waiting for the slides, I want to thank Jack
and Tom, and everyone else at the Pepperdine Law School for inviting me.
It is a great honor and pleasure to be here.
Lucy gave a very comprehensive and great overview of investment
arbitration. And what I will try to do is try to add some Korean flavor to it,
and give you a more in-depth perspective of what is going on in Korea.
One of the few things that I think I got pretty close to being right²but
my wife will say that I never get anything right of course²is what I
predicted a couple years ago. I did an article reviewing the potential of
Asian investors bringing cases. And, what I did among other things was I
plotted various things. What you have to have if you want an investment
treaty case²an investment arbitration case²is you have to have investors
that are investing a lot overseas. Koreans do that. Second, what I thought
was important was, you have to have a lot of arbitration experience. And, as
we know from our pioneering counsel here in this room, Korean counsel and
Korean clients have been very, very active in commercial arbitration. So
they have a very solid foundation in how arbitration works. So we have that
in Korea. I thought, therefore, we have those two factors and not many
countries have those two things. So I felt that it is going to happen in Korea.
And lo and behold, as we saw, we actually have this increase in cases and I
will try to shed some light on that.
What I did [in this slide], among other things, is I tried to highlight some
of the cases that are being brought in Asia. These are some of the major
cases in Asia that have been brought recently. And, as you see, the
nationalities of course can vary. And I will talk about that in a second, but,
for instance, you have this very famous case involving Phillip Morris
bringing a case against Australia concerning plain packaging cigarettes.
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They did this actually through a BIT²a bilateral investment treaty²
between Hong Kong and Australia. So they actually deliberately did this by
design. And you see here [in this slide], we have two cases against Korea.
We know the first one involving Lone Star, and then we have found out last
week that an Iranian investor has filed a trigger letter against Korea. This is
apparently not an ICSID case, and the details have just been announced so
we are still waiting to see what is involved, but this is actually another very
surprising development, that investors are bringing cases against Korea. And
as you see there, the case is . . .
Audience: Why is that surprising?
Joongi Kim: Well, that is a good question.
Audience: I am not surprised. We are in the mix.
Joongi Kim: We are in the mix. As a developed country, I guess I kind
of was, a bit maybe, over-confident in the rule of law in Korea. And I guess
I thought, you know, the Korean system, we have a good rule of law, courts
are very good and efficient, and the process is very transparent and neutral,
so investors should probably be content with the process that exists and
would not have to resort to this very expensive process. But as my wife
DOZD\V WHOOV PH ,¶YH EHHQ SURYHn wrong again. We will see. There are
scenarios that I will explore where I think there is potential, where Korea
actually is vulnerable.
As Lucy pointed out, in Korea, again very similarly, we have bilateral
investment treaties, and multilateral investment treaties. [Slide] The big
shift in Korea is, we have shifted from adding what we call investment
arbitration, the ISDS, Investor State Dispute Settlement, from BITs, and now
we are shifting more to FTAs, and this will come up in a second. So in
terms of numbers, as of March 2015, we have actually eighty-eight bilateral
investment treaties. And that actually includes not a bilateral investment
treaty, but a trilateral investment treaty between China, Japan, and Korea.
And now, this is interesting, because this is, as you see there [in the slide],
the second most in Asia; very, very aggressive in Asia. You do not see
Japan there. You do not see any other major Asian country other than
493
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China. So recently Koreans, the Foreign Ministry, and the Korean
government, have been very, very forthright in trying to push for BITs,
primarily for Korean investors when they invest overseas.
In terms of FTAs, we have nine FTAs with investor state arbitration
provisions, and three are in the works. The three are with China²we are in
the final stages of finalizing and ratifying an FTA with China, and it came
out last week, and also includes an ISDS provision²and with New Zealand,
and Columbia. So we have a total of twelve FTAs in the works that embrace
investment arbitration as a means to settle investment disputes. And, as
Lucy mentioned, we have TPP. We only have a leaked draft of TPP that
came out three years ago. So of course if anyone in this room has any more
knowledge, I would be very, very interested to hear about that.
If we look at the treaties in force [slide], you see how the numbers have
changed, and you have this big jump between the 1990s and the 2000s. It is
a very similar jump as you saw the total numbers that Lucy showed earlier.
So Korea basically followed that trend very actively. And here, [the slide]
illustrates those numbers even more. So you see those big blocks in the 90s
and the 2000s. That is where you had this huge upsurge in BITs and FTAs
with these investment arbitration provisions. And, one thing we want to
note is, you see the light blue line at the top [of the slide], and those
represent a huge number of BITs and FTAs with South and East Asian and
Pacific countries. So that has been a very important area for us that we have
been focusing on.
Now this [slide] is the same thing but based on the region. And why I
did this was, it gives you a flavor of how things have changed. So if you
look at the bottom, which is the light pink and the red, it goes from the 60s
to the 70s to the 90s and 2000s. You had this shift in focus. Basically as
E.Y. mentioned earlier, Korea was a very poor country. So what did we
need? We needed capital. So a lot of our BITs came from, for instance,
Western European countries where we needed capital from. Then, the focus
started to shift, because we were no longer an FDI importer, but we became
more of an FDI exporter. So, therefore, we branched out, and we needed
494
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FTAs in other regions of the world for our investors, where we were
investing all over the world, because, our investors, the Korean government
felt that our investors needed protection.
So, two perspectives to keep in mind: There is the sovereign
perspective, then there is the investor perspective. Sovereigns usually must
prepare for claims against them. So from the sovereign perspective, Korea is
really undergoing a baptism by fire. We are learning right now, with this
very huge case that is brought against us, and we have another case in the
works. So this builds institutional experience. Two countries come to mind:
Argentina, as Lucy mentioned, and the other one is Iran, and they have
extensive experience through the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, where
Jack and Lucy both have experience. So their governments have extensive
experience in investment arbitration, and you would not have expected they
would. They are very sophisticated and they know what is going on because
they have so much experience. Similarly, the Korean government, therefore,
is gaining this type of experience right now.
Where I see the vulnerabilities²this is what I had expected actually,
more so than this current case²is regional governments within Korea. Our
central government is very sophisticated, and they are generally sensitive to
investor needs and rights, but in the regional governments in Korea, there is
intense competition to get investments. Often under questionable terms, they
will engage in projects to try to attract investment and there is I think a lot of
vulnerability. So we expected that there might be more claims that would be
brought because of things that had happened in the regional governments.
Another area, and this has actually already happened, is contract claims.
So treaty claims are through the treaty, and that is the bulk of most
investment arbitration claims, but there are also pure contract claims; you
can have a pure contract and ask for a venue, such as ICSID or ICC. It is
basically the same thing. And we actually had a very large, almost a billion
dollar claim, brought against one of our regional governments, that was an
ICC contract claim. But basically it was an investment arbitration.
495
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As with many cases, and this is the difficulty that lies if you are a
sovereign, it is very difficult to settle, even though many times it makes
more sense to settle, because of the political implications, you cannot just
accept the risk. Some may question, ³How come you settled for 100 million
dollars?´ Which maybe was a good deal, but then you could still be held
accountable. Who knows, maybe it could have been fifty; maybe it could
have been $200 million. Therefore, governments are in a very difficult
position, so a lot of times they cannot settle, even though in a commercial
situation a commercial party usually might.
So from the investor perspective, Korean investors²and this is what I
think I had somewhat predicted²need various things as I mentioned. You
need critical mass, you need a sizable amount of investors investing
overseas, you need able counsel, and you need able in-house counsel. Able
in-house FRXQVHO FDQ WHOO WKHLU &(2V ³You know we have a lot of
experience with commercial arbitration, and it is basically a very similar
thing²we were denied certain rights and we could bring a claim. This is a
V\VWHPWKDWZRUNV´$QGWKHQIRUD&(2RUXSSHU managers who have that
H[SHULHQFH WKH\ FDQ VD\ ³2K PD\EH ZH VKRXOG WU\ WKDW´  7KHQ ZH KDYH
what I call the Se Ri Park or the Yuna Kim effect. And we might add, for
those of us in the room that know him, the Shin Hi-Taek2 effect as well.
What I mean by this is, in Korea, as you know, Se Ri Park, is a legendary
figure; out of nowhere, she comes and wins this major championship, and
now we have this whole floodgate of phenomenal female golfers all over the
world. And Yuna Kim is the same thing. Just one person can change it. If
she can do it, I can do it. And I think that is very important, that kind of
confidence. I think we have this now, basically, oQWKHLQYHVWRUVLGH³+H\
that investor brought a case when their rights were violatedZK\FDQ¶t we do
LW"´$QG LW NLQG RI EUHDNV WKHLFHDQG EUHDNV WKH PROG DQG,WKLQN WKDW LV
2. Professor
Hi-Taek
Shin,
Biography,
ARBITRATION
ACADEMY,
http://www.arbitrationacademy.org/?page_id=3073 (last visited May   ³>3URIHVVRU+L-Taek
Shin] is currently on the panel of arbitrators of ICSID . . . as well as the Korea Commercial
$UELWUDWLRQ%RDUG´ 
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why, from this perspective, it kind of allays the concerns that many investors
previously had.
And this is actually the case that Kevin briefly mentioned that was
handled by .HYLQ¶VILUPZKLFKWLHGDVWDQGDUGFRPPHUFLDOGLVSXWHZLWKDQ
investment treaty dispute. Kevin elaborated on it so I will not expand on it
anymore, but it is a very interesting case where it kind of crosses both
aspects of commercial arbitration with investment arbitration. What I will
do now is briefly overview some of the key areas that might be of interest to
you, that are common in many of the BITs and FTAs that Korea has.
As Lucy explained, these are the primary forums where investment
disputes are settled. First, ICSID. I like ICSID for one big reason among
other things: we are the same age. I was just celebrating their birthday last
week in DC. ICSID is the primary institution, but we have other institutions.
You can have, and there are, as Suzanne would of course explain, but the
ICC has investment arbitration cases. PCA is another forum. The Yukos
claim, the 50 billion dollar investment treaty claim²the largest in history²
was at the PCA.
Audience: And that is? [referring to PCA]
Joongi Kim: Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. It used to
primarily deal with a lot of state-to-state disputes, but they now maintain a
very active docket of investment treaty disputes as well. And as we saw, the
largest case in history was held there.
We have in our BITs, amicus curiae provisions. This would be a
provision for someone not directly involved in the dispute. There are certain
qualifications that they must have, but they can actually file a submission,
and they can also actually present²make oral submissions²as well. This
exists in KORUS, Korea¶s FTA with the US, and in TTP in the leak draft
that we know of. Interestingly, but maybe perhaps not surprisingly, in the
Korea-China FTA we do not have the amicus curiae provisions.
Then we have transparency provisions. There is a big push right now in
investment arbitration²international treaty arbitration is kind of a branch of
general commercial arbitration²but because there is a public aspect that we
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should increase transparency. The KORUS FTA, which follows the model
US BIT, has very extensive transparency provisions. So almost everything,
including submissions are disclosed, and hearings themselves are supposed
to be public, which is something you do not think of in your standard
commercial arbitration, where parties treasure privacy and confidentiality.
The TPP²also in the leak draft²contains a very similar provision.
However, perhaps again not surprisingly, in the China-Korea FTA we do not
have this transparency provision.
And this is just an interesting thing I dug up, in terms of language²and
I know the Korean negotiators are very proud of this²because if there is a
dispute under KORUS or KAFTA, which is the Korea-Australia FTA,
Korean has to be used, with English as well, unless the parties decide
otherwise. The Korean-Canada FTA is also very interesting. If the disputing
party²the sovereign getting sued²is Korea, then things proceed in Korean
and English. And if Canada is being sued, it has to be in French and
English. We do not have this in other treaties.
And then, another thing that is very unique, that exists in the KoreaCanada FTA, and also probably because influenced by our Canadian friends,
is this corporate social responsibility provision, which you do not really see
that often. But Canada is very active in promoting this. It is just a general
statement that countries should encourage enterprises to follow
internationally recognized standards of corporate social responsibility, and
then these principles address things such as labor, environment, human
rights, corruption, and community relations. This is not something you
normally see in many treaties, but this has been added in the Korea-Canada
FTA and it exists in the draft for the TPP.
Lucy Reed: There are two things your presentation prompts me to say.
The first is on language, which is very interesting. Language is one of the
biggest sources of expense in investment treaty arbitration, as well as in
commercial arbitration. We represented the Republic of Turkey in three
ICSID and ICSID Additional Facility cases under the Energy Charter Treaty,
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all of which Turkey won. One called Libananco3 was brought by an alleged
Cypriot investor in Turkey. As Cyprus and Turkey do not even have
diplomatic relations, it was a bit suspicious. The other two were brought by
alleged Polish investors. At the end of the day we were able to prove for the
Republic of Turkey that the claimants were members of a Turkish family,
now all under Interpol notices and fugitives, who had based their claims of
being Cypriot and Polish investors at a critical point of time on fraudulent
documents and testimony. We received what was, then, the biggest award of
costs and fees at ICSID, roughly $ 15 million in Libananco. A great
percentage of that amount was for translation and interpretation costs,
because the proceedings were in English only. And because this company,
Libananco, was just a shell company in Cyprus, there were no funds to pay
the costs award.
The second thing I want to mention, for your general knowledge in this
area²and I do not know if Beomsu Kim plans to touch on it²is that in the
past fifteen years we have seen a big change in how investment treaties
drafted. The modern model BITs put a greater emphasis on corporate social
responsibility, and carve out more robust regulatory room for the host
6WDWHV¶LQDUHDVVXFKDVHQYLURQPHQWDQGSXEOLFKHDOWK6WDWHVIROORZLQJWKH
US model BIT are reacting to cases like the Phillip Morris case, where the
claimant is challenging the mandatory plain packaging of cigarettes in
Australia on the alleged basis of an interference with their intellectual
property rights in their branding that is taken off the packages. States are
getting much more self-protective. And the area of unfair and inequitable
regulatory treatment of investors, especially with indirect control of the
investment, is being defined much more clearly. So, what I often say in Asia
when I face a lot of doubters about the TPP or FTAs, is to remember just
how much has been learned, remember we are way high on the learning
curve for both investors and states. It is a different era. With that, onto
Beomsu Kim for experiences in practice in this area.
3.

Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8.
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Beomsu Kim: Lucy, thank you very much for your kind introduction.
Before going further I want to repeat a big thanks to Professor Coe and
Pepperdine University for providing this great opportunity. I have
postulated kind of mixed feelings this morning because, as Kevin
mentioned, we are just Korean born people and quite local lawyers²local
kind of legal professionals²and we have never felt we were [making an
impact] outside of Korea. Also I am here, and Kevin is here, everyone is
here talking about international mess involving some Korean flavors and
some Korean things, but not purely on Korean matters; things just happen to
be in Korea, but the same thing may happen everywhere. So I realize that
the legal profession, or lawyers, can do whatever they are supposed to do on
behalf of someone else, regardless of whether it is in Korea or [elsewhere]. I
am supposed to talk about some practices as a practitioner in Korea now, but
it probably relates to generally everywhere in the current world.
I will briefly talk about some sentiments we had at the time of the
KORUS FTA or involving the KORUS FTA, but I would like to mention
some realities we have, regardless of the fears of additions, or concerns
related to the FTA or across FTA. And I am going to talk about how the
Korean petitioners have prepared, or how Korean government has prepared
for the ISDS. And then why we need this BIT and why we need all these
kinds of things as of now and how to develop this new era going forward,
and then I would like to make to some kind of personal conclusion²or kind
of some expectations or suspicions based on some prior experiences.
This morning I read an article about some statements made by Senator
Elizabeth Warren in the US. She really criticized and opposed the ISDS and
list to the TTP or FTA context. She criticized how unfair the proceeding is,
how the taxpayers over here are suffering, and how the non-neutrality is
being opposed by this system. That reminded me back to 2007 when we
entered into KORUS FTA. We saw that there was a big demonstration on
the streets every day and night and there was so much anti-American
sentiment that arose at the time. And that was back in 2007. Again in 2012,
when the KORUS FTA came into effect, there was another series of
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demonstrations on the street almost every day and night. Politicians, civil
groups, and intellectuals really made a statement, and they opposed
[strongly], and as Kevin mentioned, a number judges really opposed to this
ISD being [put into] effect in Korea, but, fortunately or unfortunately, we
have the FTA being placed in Korea today. And the same is going on today
as well; the continued opposition and pressures to renegotiate about the
Korea-US FTA and the ISDS.
As we have discussed this morning, we have around 100 BITs and
FTAs, but why this ISDS is so critical in [the] Korea-US FTA is because
everybody fears that some American investors are ready to, or are quite
diligent to, make claims against the Korean government, which could, at the
end of the day, directly or indirectly affect the Korean people. That is why,
in my personal view, the demonstrations are going on regarding the entering
of this Korean/US FTA as well as the reorganization of the Korea-US FTA.
So we will see how this will go.
Regardless of this opposition, or fears or concerns or criticisms, we are
having quite a different reality seen in Korea now, especially for this current
government²Park administration²[which] has [a] really broad plan to
make the FDI inward clear bound investment increase because the clear
bound FDI wants a big drive to make economic development in Korea. And
we are realizing that we are very low on the FDI in terms of absolute
numbers and in terms of relative GDP in the OECD countries. We have
one-fifth of the U.K. in terms of the GDP relatives, and one-ninth or onetenth of the U.K. in terms of absolute numbers when talking about the
amount of Korea-bound FDI. I will talk later about the FDI, as Professor
Kim mentioned.
Korean officials need to invest abroad, and that is why we need another
protection from the BIT or FTA regime to protect the Korean
Commissioners. So in reality, we need these kinds of BIT and FTAs put in
place for Korea-bound investment, and at the same time, for foreign-bound
investment made by Korean investors. With this current situation, the Park
administration made a big amendment to the Foreign Investment Promotion
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Act so that the Korean government can attract more foreign investors to
come into Korea to make investments so that the Korean economy can make
another leap up with these new investments. At the same time, the Park
administration issued a kind of report, which is describing the general
policies and measures to promote and encourage foreign investors to come
into Korea. One of the incentives is to provide tax incentives and some
other of the original or facility incentives so that many foreign investors can
come into Korea and make investments again. That is the current situation
we are in now.
At the same time, as Professor Kim mentioned, the Korean companies
have been making huge amounts of investments into other countries as well.
Data shows that the outward-FDIs exceeded by threefold to the Korea-bound
foreign investment, which means Koreans are quite diligent in making
investments in foreign countries, including some South Asian, West Asian,
and Middle Eastern countries, along with America. So those really
prompted the Korean government to put some protective measures in place,
not only for the investors, but for Korean companies, too. That is why the
data is changing, but we have about 100 BITs and FTAs as of now. My data
shows 103 BITs and FTAs, but about 100 BITs and FTAs are in place
[currently]. Thus, Korea is second to China in nation countries. We have
been inviting foreigners to come into Korea to make investments, and at the
same time, we have been promoting Korean companies to go abroad to make
investments into other regions and to expand our markets. The Korean
economy is making another step upward with those investments. With these
FTAs and BITs, as Lucy mentioned, there is very extensive investment
chapter in this FTA. The FTA is the big Bible about transactions between
two countries or multiple countries. One of the chapters is the investment
chapter, and one of the very important subchapters is the investment state
dispute mechanisms. So the Korea-China FTA has such investment chapters
with investment state dispute mechanism as well. And Korea had the same
RQHWRR$QGZHZLOOVHHPDQ\ PRUH WRFRPHLQUHODWLRQWR.RUHD¶VODWHVW
transactions, too.
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I am going to briefly talk about how Korea has prepared for this ISDS.
We do not have any central agency to be the [center] for all ISD matters.
Instead, the Korean government has had the ad hoc approach, so that some
late agencies form a committee or a task force, [where] the members of the
task force prepare the expenses and all the related proceedings. But, as
Professor Kim mentioned, Korea may change this approach on how to plan
or how to address this ISDS system going forward because if more cases
arise, then the government might need to prepare and address those issues in
a more consistent way. So the Korean government probably will answer the
question of how to prevent the dispute and how to address the dispute in a
way of having a centralized agency or some other creative ways down the
road.
As of today, although we do not have a centralized agency, various
government agencies and interest groups have prepared for this ISDS. The
Supreme Court has formed a group through research as to what ISDS is and
how the ISDS will affect the Korean judicial system because, as Kevin
mentioned, maybe some judicial decisions may be subject to the ISDS
system depending on the situation, so that is why the Korean judges are
really kind of sensitive to this ISDS system and that is why they have
formed a group to research what ISDS is, [and] how ISDS will affect the
Korean Judiciary. At the same time, the Minister of Justice (MOJ) has been
doing the central role to prepare the ISDS programs and it has reached an
ISDS committee, comprising of all the government officials, and professors,
and practitioners, and some specialists as the members for this committee.
And the MOJ has co-organized the ISD forum with the Korean Commercial
Arbitration Board (KCAB), where practitioners, professors, and officials
have regularly met to discuss and exchange views and information about
ISDS cases, regimes, and new developments. That is really helpful for the
Korean practitioners to have very updated and very detailed valuation
experience to share among these practitioners. And of course the
practitioners, like myself, have studied ISD jurisprudence for years. And as
*UDQW PHQWLRQHG RQFH .RUHDQV DUH HQJDJHG ZH GR \RX NQRZ ³EDOL EDOL´
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very, you know, in a hurry so we have been very diligent to learn a lot
within a very short period of time. So, we try to make ourselves ready to
respond or address ISDS issues when it is necessary. That is what we have
done [thus far], and at the same time, we are learning a lot from international
counsel in prominent positions, like Lucy, and from other great firms and
lawyers, and trying to make our lawyers similar to them. We have been
quite diligent to do this. At the same time we have very strong civic group
to prompt the lawyers or some interest group to be ready for this ISD
systems. So they really asked the legal professionals to prepare themselves
with this ISDS systems and development.
Up to this slide I have talked about how the Korean government has
viewed the BITs and FTAs and how Korean practitioners or interest groups
have prepared this ISDS system. But my personal view is that as time goes
by there [will be] more cases coming against the Korean government,
fortunately or unfortunately, because Korean governments, including both
the central and local governments, invited a lot of foreign investment,
directly or indirectly. Thus, naturally, Korean governments, local and
central, anticipate that conflicts with foreign investors will increase. It is
quite natural that the more transactions, the bigger the possibility of conflict
will arise from these transactions or relations. With all the experiences,
knowledge, and information, it seems that the Korean government has
viewed BITs and FTAs to correlate to the investment, inward or outward,
and interestingly, they have kind of viewed that the FTA flows in Korea
have been significantly increasing since the Korea-EU FTA has been in
effect. As of now the EU, China, U.S., and Japan are four major trade
partners with Korean companies and Korean government. The Korean
government has viewed that with all these BITs, FTAs, and transaction
investments among those countries, the Korean government insists that we
need a system to respond to this ISDS system and to address these kinds of
matters in another proper way. Quite interestingly, this month the Minister
of Justice published this book, unfortunately it is in Korean only, but they
have very diligently researched and prepared how to prepare, from the
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Korean perspective, for the ISDS to come. It is a really good guideline for
Korean practitioners to follow. It is a quite interesting book, so if you are
interested you can find good references and good directions from the Korean
government from this book.
This is my personal view [regarding whether] BITs or FTAs have the
potential to be the basis for another ISDS case. My personal view is that the
BITs between Korea and EU member states may be the big potential . . . for
the future of ISDS cases. And as Kevin [mentioned], the Korea-China BIT
or Korea-China FTA may be another basis in taking into account all the
transaction volumes and the transaction natures being made with the Korean
investors, as well as Chinese investors in Korea because we have a lot of
transactions between the two. So those BITs and FTAs may be the potential
basis for future ISDS cases from the Korean perspective.
With all of this, I was about to show a kind of chart for this. This [slide
shows] a summary chart of the complaints filed by foreign investors with the
Korea Trades Agency Ombudsman System. So I highlighted²there are a
lot²but I did find some items having more than 5% ratio to the cases. You
will see the investment incentives, like the complaint, complained of activity
of investment systems and procedures and taxation and so on. These are
quite telling because, you will see this, I am looking for the Lone Star
against Korean government for the first ICSID proceeding, now against
Kevin. For the Lone Star case this piece arose in relation to the investment
system procedure as well as taxation. As you have seen, the complaint
related to the investment systems and procedures and taxations are taking
very high positions compared to the other items. It is quite interesting to see
from this perspective. At the same time, as we have heard, a new case by
the Iranian investor has lead again to the investment systems and procedures
because²my understanding is that²the investor wanted to make an
investment, but for some reason the transfer did not go through, and that is
why the union investor filed or encouraged Korean government to have this
ISD case. It is also related to this investment system and procedure. And
the next bullet point [on the slide], the particular significance is that the
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Korean government itself acknowledged or saw that it needs to improve
foreseeability of government policies throughout the IFDI, which means that
[the] Korean government saw that there was some gray area to be improved
in relation to this investment regime because it may give some
unforeseeability for the foreign investors; it may cause some complaints
filed by foreign investors, [and] later on it may develop into another dispute
between Korean government and foreign investors. So it is quite useful to
follow which areas that Korean-bound foreign investors have been feeling
uncomfortable [about]. So those are my personal views²that the Korean
government must really view those systems or as a regime, you know, to
reduce the possibilities or probabilities of future ISD cases. That is all I
have today, thank you very much. Thank you.
Lucy Reed: I have asked Professor Kim to tell you briefly about the
case that nobody has known about until now.
Joongi Kim: This is a very interesting case that no one knows about and
it is the first case where a Korean investor actually obtained an award. I do
not know if it is the first case that was filed, but it is, from what we know,
the first case where an investor received an award. The basic facts are this.
There is a treaty²that even Lucy Reed does not know about²called the
Moscow Convention, and if anyone knows about this treaty I would really
welcome their input. I have asked several experts in Russia about this treaty.
It is basically a treaty involving about four or five CIS countries. And this
treaty has a very unique provision that allows investors from non-member
states of the treaty. The investment treaty is basically for investors from the
member states of the treaty, but it allows for investors of non-member states
to bring a case against a country that is party to the treaty. There is
apparently a Korean investor, apparently a real estate developer, and he
brought a case against Kyrgyzstan at a very not that well known arbitral
institution in Moscow, and he obtained an arbitral award through this treaty.
Not a small claim, about²I think²$10 million. And there are several other
investors that brought claims under this treaty, and won awards. The award
is currently being challenged in Moscow courts, and apparently there is a
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similar, parallel case where that award was set aside. So there is a likelihood
that the award might be set aside, but for whatever it is worth, it is the first
investment award by a Korean investor.
Lucy Reed: So, any questions at this point from the audience for this
panel?
Audience: Who are the parties for the Moscow treaty?
Joongi Kim: I do not know exactly, but, if I recall correctly,
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and several other²four or five²CIS countries. Not
that many.
Audience: Mr. Beomsu Kim, you mentioned nine Lone Star Cases?
Most of the transactions that Korea did were sometime in 1997 during the
financial crisis, but the Korea-US FTA and the Korea FTA with EU took
place sometime in 2012, so how are they able to invoke this ISD?
Beomsu Kim: I should probably make some corrections if it was
unclear before, but Lone Star cases involved a U.S. investment company, but
the ISD was invoked based on not the Korea-US FTA or Korea-US BIT, but
instead, is based on Korea-Belgium BIT, which has been in effect since the
mid-70s, so the invocation of the BIT is not the Korea-US FTA or the
Korea-EU FTA.
Lucy Reed: It would be worth spending a few minutes explaining and
GHVFULELQJWKH/RQH6WDUFDVHIRUWKRVHZKRGRQ¶WNQRZLWEHFDXVHLWLVVXFK
a touchstone of a case.
Beomsu Kim: We have discussed today that since 1997, Korea, in a
meaningful sense, has become a member of the international community.
Before that, Korea was, as someone called it, a hermit kingdom; we were a
very distant and small country. However, it was hit hard by the Asian
financial crisis, together with Thailand and some other Asian countries in
1996 and 1997. That really prompted Korea to become a member of the
international community, and after the financial crisis, many Korea-bound
investments were made²which were sometimes fortunate and sometimes
unfortunate. With this flood of Korea-bound investments, many bankrupt
companies were revived and the Korean economy flourished²particularly
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since 1999 and 2000. With this, the Lone Star, a private equity fund, made
huge investments into a Korean bank, which nearly went bankrupt in early
2000. Lone Star made a huge investment, and it took a longer time to make
an exit from such an investment, so that really made the basis for a claim
against the Korean government. That case is really the first case against the
Korean government with a huge claim amount of $4.5 billion. Before the
Yukos case, the Lone Star case was the biggest ICSID case in terms of the
claim amount to the extent of my knowledge. And that proceeding started in
2012, based on the Korea-Belgium BIT, and is still on-going.
Lucy Reed: Just to add, because counsel cannot say too much, a couple
of things. The existence of ICSID disputes is always public. The World
Bank has a website listing all the cases filed and a brief procedural history of
each, not the content usually. UNCITRAL and other cases are not always
publicly known until the awards come out, if at all. This is one of the
reasons for the inexact data. We know about Lone Star, because it is an
ICSID case and, as I understand from public sources, the theory is that Lone
Star wanted to get out of its investment and was not allowed to, and over
time, the investment lost a great deal of value. You said how many billion?
Beomsu Kim: 4.5 billion.
Lucy Reed: I am not involved, but it must involve claims of unfair and
inequitable treatment, maybe indirect expropriation, maybe umbrella clause.
It is the focus of a lot of attention.
Audience: Just a quick follow up on that²so once there is an
arbitration award, how does the collection happen?
Lucy Reed: That is a good question. It is one that we as counsel who
represent investors ask before we start a case²what will happen if you win
an award? Until the Argentina cases, virtually all States that had lost in
ICSID arbitration²generally they were contract disputes selecting ICSID
arbitration²voluntarily paid. If not paid voluntarily, the investor must
resort to the provision in the ICSID Convention that says that any signatory
State of the ICSID convention is to enforce ICSID awards in its national
courts as if they were final judgments of their highest courts²so there is no
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opportunity to review on the merits. This avenue has not yet been actually
tested in a highly disputed ICSID award. Also, as in commercial arbitration,
we often see that after a treaty award comes out there is negotiation of the
amount. Again, there are interesting developments in the field. There are
hedge funds that buy unpaid ICSID awards at some discount, lump them
together if there are multiple awards (as there have been against Argentina),
and then negotiate for payment. Argentina recently paid off the five or six
old awards that it had not paid to a hedge fund that owned them all. You can
securitize almost anything.
A second related thing is that third party funders now are investing in
quite a number of cases for investors. This can be critical where a small-tomedium-size investor lost its entire investment, and might not be able to
proceed without financial support.
7R JR EDFN WR WKLVJHQWOHPDQ¶VTXHVWLRQ D YHU\ JRRG question, let me
add that sophisticated investors, particularly in infrastructure and natural
resource concessions, look before they invest to make sure they are investing
through an entity incorporated validly in a country that has an investment
treaty with the host State. It is, as I was saying yesterday, effectively
malpractice now for advisors to investors²/corporate partners in a law firm,
for example²not to have on the due diligence checklist a question asking if
WKHUHLVDWUHDW\IRU³$UPDJHGGRQ´SUotection if the investment goes wrong.
And I do mean Armageddon; these are not easy cases.
Joongi Kim: Just two things. States have very powerful incentives to
comply with the awards voluntarily because it effects their reputation so
most states will comply.
Lucy Reed: I do not really buy that, because investors are going back in
Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia. If there is oil or other resources at a deep
enough discount, investors go back. But it is bad for the population, because
the terms are much worse, the protections are much higher payment
guarantees. It is very bad for the people of those countries.
Joongi Kim: Just to add one more thing²if it is a non-ICSID award,
then you just go through the New York Convention.
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Lucy Reed: Like an UNCITRAL award. We took an UNCITRAL
award, Freshfields did, all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, for British
Gas. This is the first investment treaty case the Supreme Court has decided,
and they found in favor of enforcement of the award.
Audience: In the ICSID arbitration, is there a different dynamic, as
opposed to commercial arbitration?
Joongi Kim: Yes. Through standard investment arbitration, the parties
will usually choose their wings and they will agree upon the chair. The
difficulty is where they do not agree upon the chair. There are various
procedures where the institutions will try to help them, but if that does not
work, then ultimately, if it is for ICSID to decide, they will appoint the chair.
Beomsu Kim: One thing to add is that those must be third party
nationals.
Joongi Kim: In the case of ICSID, unless the parties agree otherwise.
Lucy Reed: There is a strict rule that the chair cannot be a national of
any of the parties, and ICSID has certain lists from which it has to pick
arbitrators. The Permanent Court of Arbitration makes a lot of appointments
as well in non-ICSID cases. Do we think about different things in
appointing arbitrators in treaty rather than commercial arbitrations? Yes, we
think about very different things including familiarity with treaty law, public
international law, and expertise with accounting and discounted cash flow
quantum.
Audience: It seems to be about only twenty people are historically
appointed.
Lucy Reed: Well, each State gets to name four to its list, but they often
name people without expertise whom ICSID cannot call upon, so there is a
smaller list of tried and true public international arbitrators. Too small
actually for the ongoing good health of the system.
Audience: Most of awards that I have seen are about 150 pages. They
seem to be getting longer and longer. Do you have thoughts or comments
about that aspect? To me it seems almost ridiculously long.
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Lucy Reed: They are longer, in part, because they are going to be
public. Unlike an average commercial award where the parties know the
IDFWVWKH\NQRZWKHEDFNJURXQGDQGDOOWKH\QHHGWRNQRZLV³\RXZLQRU
\RXUGRQRWZLQ´ZLWKEDVLFUHDVRQV+HUH,WKLQNWULEXQDOVDUHDZDUHWKDW
their awards are going to be published and the people reading them will have
no idea of what the facts were and what each side argued, yet the awards
will be cited by parties in future arbitrations in discussions of applicable law
and interpretation of common treaty provisions, and they are going to be
used by future tribunals for better or worse. There are issue conflicts.
By the way, issue conflict is another reason you see repeat ICSID
arbitrators. At Freshfields, we have a rule that none of our lawyers can sit as
treaty arbitrators because of issue conflict²if you decide what an umbrella
clause means, or unfair and inequitable treatment means in an award with
your name on it, it can be hard to argue for your client a different way. So
now there is a natural evolution to where individuals are either going to be
treaty arbitrators and FTA arbitrators, or they are going to be counsel, and
not both, so that is narrowing the field.
Joongi Kim: Some of the submissions are a thousand pages long
anyways.
Beomsu Kim: One thing is that there is an undermining proceeding
about the awards that one of the reason is to make the words well-reasoned
and well-drafted.
Lucy Reed: Let me go back to my five questions from 2007, and get
VRPH KHOS LQ DQVZHULQJ VRPH RI WKHP  7KH ILUVW RQH LV ³ZLOO WKHUH EH
FDVHV´"7KHDQVZHULV\HVWKHUHDUH cases. We know of maybe four. Two
definite cases against the Republic of Korea, and we hear of two more, and
maybe more. How many cases have there been by Korean investors against
other States?
Joongi Kim: From what I know, three cases. That is what I know. And
more in the pipeline apparently.
Kevin Kim: Three cases, we are representing claimants.
Lucy Reed: So you have all three?
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Joongi Kim: If they have three, then there are four, I think.
E.Y. Park: If you count those cases there are cases that are officially
filed, there are two or three. But there are a bunch of cases that have not
gone as far to be filed officially, but they are in negotiation with a foreign
sovereign or in serious discussion just before the filing and so forth. And
that, I think, is a great area for development. It is interesting how it goes to
the next level before being filed. I know there are many big corporations
that are hesitant to file because of various reasons. One reason is that some
foreign sovereigns might take it personally, then they may have difficulties.
Lucy Reed: That is absolutely one of the factors that our clients weigh.
You have to think long and hard before you sue certain governments. And a
ORWRIWULJJHUOHWWHUVDUHZULWWHQDQGVHQWWRVD\³ZHKDYe a dispute starting a
WKUHH RU VL[ PRQWK FRROLQJ RII SHULRG´ ZLWK SHUKDSV QR LQWHQWLRQ RI HYHU
really pursuing the case.
7KH VHFRQG TXHVWLRQ LV ³KRZ ZLOO WKH 52. JRYHUQPHQW GHIHQG WKH
FDVHV´"  :H VHH WKH\ DUH GHIHQGLQJ WKH FDVHV TXLWH VHULRXVO\ DQG
professionally and aggressively.
7KHWKLUGLV³KRZZLOO52.LQYHVWRUVSURVHFXWHWKHFDVHV´",DPVXUH
WKH\DUHDOVRDJJUHVVLYHVHULRXVDQGSURIHVVLRQDO7KHIRXUWKLV³DUHWKH\
XVLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDORUORFDOH[SHUWLVHRUERWK´"$V\RXKHDUGLQWKH/RQH
Star case there are Korean firms²Shin & Kim and Bae Kim & Lee for
either side, and international firms Arnold Porter and Sidley Austin. These
are great teams, and we know there is a mix of international and local
counsel in other cases. For ROK investors, I personally would be happy to
see only Korean law firms involved in the prosecution. They are very
experienced at this point with the law, and well able to do it. But there will
always be a factor of who is on the tribunal, in thinking whether one of the
international firms needs to come in or not.
0\ODVWTXHVWLRQZDV³ZLOOWKHIRFXVEHPRUHRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUHDW\ODZ
RUORFDOODZ´",QWKHFDVHV DJDLQVWWKH5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD,JXHVVWKHUHLV
more focus on international and treaty law, which is always the default
governing law, but there will definitely be lots of Korean law. You saw the
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list that we were talking about²taxation issues, labor issues, governance
issues²so there is always going to be some Korean law.
The question I would add going forward LV³DUHWKHUH.RUHDQQDWLRQDOV
WR EH QDPHG DV DUELWUDWRUV LQ LQYHVWPHQW FDVHV´"  , NQRZ RQH SHUVRQ
Professor Hi-Taek Shin, has been. So, it is not the hermit kingdom anymore
in this area²a very interesting area of development.
Thank you all for your attention. I have saved my thanks for all for the
end. As you have heard, our Korean colleagues here are very busy people,
and many of them are getting ready for the Lone Star hearing in May²these
hearings are real marathons of preparation and execution. Thanks as well to
others, including judges and practitioners coming this afternoon. For many
of us, coming here shows the great respect and loyalty that we feel for
Professor Coe and Professor Stipanowich and Pepperdine for sharing their
ideas and their community with us over the years. And for me, this goes to
Jack Coe in particular, whom I met at the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, where I
was the U.S. Agent and Jack worked for a U.S. judge. That Tribunal, led by
the United States and Iran, saw fit to publish all of its major awards on
expropriation and international contract breach, which are now being used
by so many young practitioners in investment treaty arbitration. So we are
always very happy to come to Pepperdine.
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